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People  flows  refers  to  the  movement  of  people  across  international  borders  in  the  form  of
immigration, international student flows, business travel, and tourism. Despite its peripheral status
in debates over globalization, the movement of people from low income to high income countries
is fundamental in global economic development, with consequences for factor endowments, trade
patterns, and transfer of technology. In part because people flows are smaller than trade and capital
flows, the dispersion of pay for similarly skilled workers around the world exceeds the dispersion
of the prices of goods and cost of capital. This suggests that policies that give workers in developing
countries greater access to advanced country labor markets could raise global economic well-being
considerably. The economic problem is that immigrants rather than citizens of immigrant-receiving
countries benefit most from immigration. The paper considers "radically economic policies" such
as auctioning immigration visas or charging sizeable fees and spending the funds on current residents
to increase the economic incentive for advanced countries to accept greater immigration.
Richard B. Freeman










The policy debate over globalization in the past decade has largely bypassed the 
international mobility of labor.  Restrict trade and cries of protectionism resound.  Suggest 
linking labor standards to trade and it’s protectionism in disguise.  Limit capital flows and the 
International Monetary Fund is on your back.  But restrict people flows? That’s just an 
accepted exercise of national sovereignty! During the last few decades, when most countries 
reduced barriers to trade of goods and services and liberalized financial capital markets, most 
also sought to limit immigration.   In this essay, I examine what we know about the causes and 
consequences of immigration.  I argue that people flows are fundamental to creating a global 
economy and that the interplay among immigration, capital, and trade is essential to 
understanding the way globalization affects economies.  I consider ways to reduce barriers to 
immigration that could improve the well being of workers around the world.    
 
The New Global Immigration 
 
The United Nations has estimated that in 2000 around 175 million people or 2.9 
percent of the world lived outside their country of birth. Furthermore, the United Nations has 
projected an increase in immigrants to about 190 million by 2005, more than twice as many as 
the 82.5 million immigrants in 1970 (International Organization for Migration, 2005a; United 
Nations, 2004, Table 2, p. viii). Two-thirds of immigrants are in advanced countries, where 





percent of the population are foreign-born (United Nations, 2004, Table II.7, p. 43).  About 10 
percent of immigrants are refugees.1  
Table 1 shows that the single biggest recipient of immigrants was the United States. 
Since Congress enacted the 1965 Immigration Act, which ended quotas based on national 
origin, immigration to the United States has increased greatly. In 1964-69, Canada, Australia, 
and New Zealand admitted more immigrants than the United States, but by 2000-2002, the 
United States admitted more than twice as many immigrants as these countries.  In 2000, the 
35 million immigrants to the United States constituted 12.4 percent of the population, up from 
4.7 percent in 1970.  Because most immigrants are of working age, the immigrant proportion 
of persons aged 25-39 was higher at 19.4 percent.   Immigrants made up approximately half of 
the 1990s job growth in the United States and added 2.3 million new workers during the 
slower job growth of from March 2000 to March 2004, when native-born employment was 
roughly constant (Camarota, 2004, Table 1). 
The second biggest recipient of immigration was Russia – the result of the collapse of 
the Soviet Empire, which induced many persons of Russian ancestry to move to Russia and 
which turned internal migration within the Soviet Union into international migration.  
Germany is third with 7.3 million immigrants, followed by a diverse set of countries with 4-7 
million immigrants, such as Ukraine, Saudi Arabia, France, Australia, Canada, and India and 
Pakistan. 
Measured by the proportion of foreign born, the listing of countries changes.   Middle 
                                                 
1  Estimates of the number of immigrants in a country usually come from Censuses of 





Eastern countries were the largest recipients of immigrants: in the United Arab Emirates, 68 
percent of the population are guest workers, Kuwait has 49 percent foreign-born; Jordan has 
39 percent foreign-born, largely from Palestine; and Israel has 37 percent foreign-born, largely 
from Russia (United Nations, 2002, Figure 2).  The percentage of immigrants in Canada (18 
percent) and Australia (23 percent) exceeds the percentage in the United States  
Even in advanced countries with smaller immigrant proportions, major cities attract 
people from all parts of the globe.  In 2000, 23 percent of Parisians were born outside France; 
28 percent of London residents were born outside the United Kingdom. Immigrant proportions 
are also high in major cities in some developing countries – 30 percent of the population in 
Abidjan, Nigeria, for instance, were born outside Nigeria. In many countries, agricultural and 
mining workers are immigrants, often undocumented, from lower income economies: 
Dominicans work in Puerto Rico; Haitians work in the Dominican Republic; Africans from 
nearby countries work in South Africa, and so on.   
Table 1 shows that the top migrant-sending countries are China, with 35 million 
natives moving to other countries, India (20 million) and the Philippines (7 million) 
(International Organization for Migration, 2005a) – all low income countries.   
The years of schooling and occupational attainment of immigrants relative to natives 
varies greatly among receiving countries and source countries.  Many U.S. immigrants, 
(particularly those from Mexico) have less than high school education, while at the same time 
many have advanced degrees.  For instance, in 2000 45 percent of U.S.-based Ph.D. 
economists and 55 percent of U.S.-based PhD natural scientists aged 45 years old or younger 
                                                                                                                                                         





were born outside the United States (tabulated from Ruggles et al., <http://www.ipums.org>). 
In some other countries immigrants are disproportionately highly skilled.  Immigrants to 
Australia are twice as likely to have university degrees as natives and 60 percent of 
immigrants to the United Kingdom are professionals.  The substantial flow of educated 
persons from developing countries to advanced countries has brought the issue of “brain 
drain” from the predominantly low-income migrant-sending countries to the fore in discussion 
of international migration. 
 
Shifting Patterns of Migration 
Current international migration differs from the mass immigration of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth century in several ways.  First, the numbers involved currently are smaller 
relative to world population.  For instance, the 8.8 million immigrants who came to the United 
States in 1901-1910 period is of similar magnitude to the 9.1 million immigrants who came in 
the 1991-2000 period, but both the U.S. and world populations were much larger than in 
1901-1910.  Second, nearly half of current immigrants are women, whereas in the past 
immigrants were disproportionately men.  Third, the primary destinations of inflow and 
outflow are different. In the nineteenth century, the primary flow of immigration was “poor 
and huddled” Europeans seeking a better life in the Americas (Hatton and Williamson, 1998). 
 From the 1830s through the 1920s, 13 percent of Europe’s labor force migrated; in Ireland 
and Italy some 30 percent of the labor force migrated.  In contrast, immigrants today consist 





 Traditional European immigrant source countries such as Ireland, Italy, and Spain have 
become immigrant-receiving countries, while formerly immigrant-receiving Latin America 
has become a source of emigrants. With low birth rates in wealthier countries, and a growing 
share of the world’s population in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, migration from low 
income countries to the advanced countries is likely to continue. 
 
An Aside on Temporary Migration 
Permanent immigration, on which this essay focuses, is not the only form of people 
flows in the global economy.  Low-cost travel coupled with employment and educational 
opportunities in other countries has led many persons to cross national borders for temporary 
periods.2   
Temporary or guest workers are recruited for specific jobs for fixed periods, often in 
such industries as construction or seasonal agriculture or manufacturing. In the 1960s through 
the early 1970s, Germany recruited upwards of 2.6 million guest workers, mostly from 
Turkey.  Between 1942 and 1964, the United States recruited some 4.6 million Mexican 
braceros to work on farms – roughly nine times as many Mexicans as came as immigrants 
(Martin, 2001). South Africa recruits more than 100,000 foreign workers annually for its gold 
                                                 
2  Economic transformations of developing countries have also created massive rural-urban 
migration within countries. Migration within some developing countries is comparable to 
international migration, both in the distance involved in the migrant move and in the impact of 
the move on lifestyles.  Since 1950, the urban share of the world’s population grew from 30 
percent to about half, largely through within-country migration.  China severely restricted 
rural-urban flows through the early 1980s, but then economic reforms that weakened 
government control over the economy and relaxation of residence rules produced the largest 
people flow in history, as approximately 150 million rural Chinese moved to urban areas 





and coal mines. The oil-producing countries recruit temporary migrants to do everything from 
housekeeping to construction to professional work.   
 
There is little international regulation of temporary migrant work.  The International 
Labor Organization has two conventions on migrant labor, but relatively few country 
signatories.3 The General Agreement on Trade in Services, incorporated into the World Trade 
Organization, was designed to ease temporary migration of service workers but has not yet 
produced any agreements.  Many temporary migrant source countries negotiate bilateral 
treaties with migrant using countries to protect their citizens from exploitation of various 
forms. 
In addition to temporary workers, there are international students, who travel overseas 
on student visas for their schooling and who in principle intend to return to their home country 
upon completing their schooling.  In 2004, there were approximately two million international 
students. The United States is the largest single student destination, with 573,000 overseas 
students, one-fourth from China and India.  But other countries compete in the market for 
international students.  Some Australian universities give foreign students, largely from Asia, 
a bachelor’s degree for studying three years in their native country and one year in Australia, 
and the students get points that make it easier for them to migrate to the country permanently.   
International tourism, defined as the temporary movement of people across national 
borders for vacations, holidays, visiting family or friends, and business trips, is another major 
                                                 
3 Specifically, 44 countries signed Convention No. 97 of 1949 concerning Migration for 
Employment and 18 countries signed Convention No. 143 of 1975 concerning Migrations in 
Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant 
Workers (Ruhs and Chang, 2004, Table 2, p. 93; see also 
<http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/newratframeE.htm>). The United States has not signed 





people flow.  The World Tourism Organization estimates that there were 760 million 
international tourist arrivals in 2004: 19 percent for business, 54 percent for vacation/holidays, 




What’s Bigger:  People Flows, Trade, or Capital Flows? 
 
There is no single metric on which to compare the economic importance of people 
flows, trade, and capital flows.  Therefore, I compare the relative sizes of the three 
components of globalization with a few different measures. 
First, I calculate immigration, trade, and foreign capital flows relative to the global 
workforce, global production, and global investment activity, respectively.  As shown earlier, 
the stock of immigrants is nearly 3 percent of the global workforce and 9 percent of the 
workforce in advanced economies.  By contrast, the ratio of world exports to world GDP was 
27 percent in 2004.  But exports are measured as sales, while GDP is a value-added measure, 
which excludes the purchases of materials and products from other sectors.  Taking total sales 
as roughly twice GDP, a more valid measure of international trade’s share of world output 
would be around 13 percent.  Foreign direct investment averaged between 2 and 3 percent of 
global gross capital formation per year from the 1970s through the late 1980s.  Since then, 
foreign direct investment has been volatile, rising to 20 percent of global gross capital 
formation in 2000 but it then falling to 7.5 percent of gross capital formation in 2004 
(UNCTAD, 2004).  An alternative measure of the globalization of capital markets is the share 
of foreign equities in investors’ equity portfolio, which rose from negligible numbers in the 





comparisons suggests that trade and international capital flows are a larger proportion of 
activity in goods and capital markets than immigration is in labor markets, presumably 
because governments have reduced trade barriers and liberalized capital markets but have not 
lowered barriers to immigration.
4  
Another way to gauge the extent of globalization in labor markets versus other markets 
is to contrast the dispersion of wages with the dispersion of the prices of goods and dispersion 
                                                 
4 Factor content analysis is another way to put the three components of globalization in context. 
This uses labor input coefficients by industry to transform the imports and exports of goods into 
the number of workers of different types and capital that might have produced (or not produced) 
the goods absent trade.  Borjas, Katz, and I (1997) estimated that immigration affected the U.S. 
skill distribution more than trade. The huge immigration of less skilled workers from Mexico 
dominated the differences in the skill mix between workers in import-intensive and export-
intensive industries. These calculations generated debate about the appropriate counterfactual for 
factor content analysis (Krugman, 2000; Deardorff, 2000; Leamer, 2000) and the appropriate 
input ratios (Wood,1994; Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1997).  In countries with less immigration 





of the cost of capital.  Trade and factor flows are supposed to equalize prices across countries. 
 Reductions in barriers to trade and liberalization of capital markets notwithstanding, wages in 
similar occupations vary more around the world than do prices of nominally similar bundles of 
goods and the cost of capital. This suggests that the labor market is the least developed part of 
globalization.  
Table 2 documents the huge variation in wages for roughly comparable workers in the 
1998-2002 period, using the Occupational Wages Around the World dataset. The table shows 
the range of pay across five occupations, transformed from national currencies to U.S. dollars 
using market exchange rates in three of the columns and using purchasing power parity 
exchange rates in three other columns.  It gives the wages for the country at the top 20% point 
of the earnings distribution and for the country at the bottom 20% point of earnings 
distribution for each occupation. The ratios of wages measured in exchange rates between 
countries in these two positions are on the order of twelve to one. The ratios of wages 
measured in purchasing power parity units between countries in these two positions are on the 
order of four to five to one.  The pattern of huge country differences is found for other 
occupations in the data file as well. 
The dispersion of prices for nominally similar goods is much less than the dispersion 
shown in Table 2.  Consider, for example, the price of a well-known commodity, McDonald’s 
Big Mac sandwich (data are for 65 countries from 
http://www.economist.com/markets/bigmac/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2708584http://www.s
kfriends.com/big-mac-index.htm).  In 2004 the price of a Big Mac at the 80
th percentile of Big 
Mac prices based on exchange rates was $2.65 while the price of a Big Mac in the countries at 
the 20
th percentile of Big Mac prices was $1.40 – a 1.9:1 spread.  The comparison using 
purchasing power parity exchange rates is even closer.  





and Leuz’s (2004, Table 1) estimates of the international differences in the cost of capital 
show a variation between the return at the top 25
th percentile to the return at the bottom 25
th 
percentile that averages 1.43 across estimates from five different sources.  
     These differences in the dispersion of wages and prices suggest that globalization has 
not reduced wage differences among similarly skilled workers as much as it has reduced price 
differences and differences in cost of capital.  Indeed, geographic variation in wages and living 
standards around the world gives the global economy the appearance of a gated wealthy 
community consisting of the advanced countries, surrounded by impoverished ghettos, with 
immigration restrictions preventing the ghetto residents from moving to where their 
productivity and well-being would be higher.   
 
 
The Economics of People Flows 
 
 
Why do immigrants come? How do they do? How do immigrants affect their 
destination countries? How does emigration affect source countries?  Analyses provide clear 
answers to why people immigrate and how they do in their new country. There is considerable 
and often heated controversy over the impacts of immigration on destination and source 
countries.  
Why Do Immigrants Come?  
For economic gain, says the economist. Through social networks, says the sociologist. 
 Over short distances, says the geographer.  For family reasons, say the rules for visas in many 





high GDP per capita and is greater the smaller the distance between countries (Borjas, 1987; 
Kamemera, Oguledo and Davis, 2000; Clark, Hatton and Williamson, 2002).  In the late 
1990s, the ratios of source country GDP per capita to receiving GDP per capita among 15 
OECD immigrant receiving countries were all below one.  The average of the ratios was 0.57, 
which implies that receiving countries had incomes that were 57 percent of those in source 
countries.  Weighting the ratios by numbers of immigrants, to count countries with more 
immigrants more heavily, gave a lower average ratio of 0.44 (based on data in Coppel, 
Dumont, and Visco, 2001, table 5).5  Mayda (2005) reports that economic conditions in 
recipient countries were stronger determinants of immigration flows in the 1980s and 1990s 
than conditions in source countries, in the sense that a strong economy in the former was more 
likely to attract immigrants than a weak economy in source countries.  Economic factors 
motivate the huge levels of illegal immigration, as well, producing a multi-billion dollar 
illegal industry that transports some four million people across borders annually worldwide.  
Passel (2005) estimates that on the order of seven million illegal immigrants worked in the 
United States in 2005. Wickramasekera (2002, p. 19) estimates annual worldwide illegal 
trafficking in people of about six million. 
Are international immigrants positively selected from their source countries? The ideal 
data to answer this and related questions about relative skills would record a person’s 
economic performance in their home country before they immigrated and their performance in 
the receiving country (along with similar data for non-immigrants in both countries), but 
                                                 
5  Mean differences in incomes across countries are the main driver of international 
migration. However, the shape of the income distribution in source and receiving countries 
can also affect the rate and composition of immigration (Borjas, 1987).  Consider two 
countries with similar mean incomes but with different dispersions of income.  A low-wage 
worker could earn more in the country with the smaller dispersion of income, while the high 
wage worker could earn more in the country with the greater dispersion.  Indeed, high paid 
workers move from Europe, where institutional wage setting and income tax rates reduce 





standard longitudinal surveys do not follow persons across country lines. Hendricks’ (2002) 
tabulations of the years of schooling of immigrants to the United States by country of origin, 
and of the average years of schooling in country of origin, provides the strongest available 
evidence for positive selection (United Nations, 2004, Box IV.1, p 98). These data show that 
immigrants average 12.9 years of years of schooling compared to an average of 5.7 years of 
schooling in the countries from which they come. But the educational composition of 
particular immigrant flows can diverge from the general pattern. Ramos (1992) and Castillo-
Freeman and Freeman (1992) found that migrants from Puerto Rico to the United States 
consisted disproportionately of less-educated workers, who had greater chances of 
employment at higher earnings on the mainland than on the island. Ibarraran and Lubotsky’s 
(2005) analysis of the 2000 Mexican Census shows that recent migrants from Mexico tend to 
be less educated than non-migrants. Shorter distances makes it easier for these less educated 
immigrants to come to the United States.  Many immigrants with less than high school 
education are from Mexico and El Salvador, who often enter the United States illegally. In 
2000, about 8 percent of the Mexican-born population was living in the United States and 30 
percent of Mexicans with formal sector jobs worked in the United States (International 
Organization for Migration, 2005a, p. 196).   
The source countries for immigration differ among advanced countries for historical 
reasons that reflect the influence of social networks.  Former territories and colonies are an 
important source of arrivals for England and France. Vietnamese migrate to Australia and the 
United States due to ties built up from the Vietnam War. Turks are a prime immigrant group 
in Germany.  Specific locales in developing countries are major sources of immigration – for 
instance, some districts in Guangdong, Fugian, and Zhejiang in China, or Sylhet and Mirpur in 
Bangladesh and Pakistan have many emigrants, while few persons leave from other areas in 





their area. Once a group enters a country, moreover, relatives immigrate to reunify families.  
About 70 percent of U.S. immigrants enter as immediate relatives of citizens or are family-
sponsored.  The proportion of immigrants for family reunification is equally high in France, 
and significant in other countries as well (OECD, SOPEMI 2001, Trends in International 
Migration, chart 1.2; International Migration Organization, 2005a, p. 388).  
 
How Do Immigrants Do? 
U.S. data show that immigrants earn less than the native-born overall and less than the 
native-born with the same years of schooling, but that these differences decline over time.  In 
addition, immigrant/native earnings differentials vary across cohorts, as the human capital 
“quality” of immigrants changes largely due to changes in the proportion of immigrants 
coming from countries with more/less schooling (Borjas, 1992).  In other immigrant-receiving 
countries, immigrants also earn less than otherwise comparable natives, but with considerable 
variation in magnitudes (Adsera and Chiswick, 2004).  In most advanced countries, 
immigrants have higher unemployment rates and lower employment rates than native workers 
(OECD, SOPEMI, 1998, Figure 1).  The United Kingdom is a partial exception, where 
immigrants have higher skills and earnings than the native-born, but also have higher 
unemployment than natives (Glover et al., 2001; Kahn, 2004). As immigrants accrue 
experience and assimilate, they close some of the gap in earnings or occupational attainment 
in most countries, even when the number of immigrants is huge, as in Israel in the 1990s 
(Eckstein and Weiss, 1998).   





country and what comparable persons earn in their home country, particularly among less 
skilled workers.  For example, in 2000 a Mexican with 5-8 years of schooling earned $11.20 
per hour in the United States compared to around $1.82 per hour in areas of Mexico with high 
rates of migration to the United States -- a six-fold difference.
6  The huge gains in income that 
immigrants from a low-income country obtain by moving to a high-income country virtually 
guarantees that most of the gains to immigrants occur not because of positive selectivity of 
immigrants but rather because high-income countries have more complementary inputs: higher 
capital-labor ratios, more modern technology, superior infrastructure, more efficient markets 
due to greater legal protections of property and persons, and lower levels of corruption and 
rent-seeking.   
The effect of differences in capital-labor ratios and in the organization of markets on 
the earnings gain to immigrants who move from a developing country to a developed country 
can be estimated crudely.  To assess how much of the difference in earnings between similarly 
skilled persons in advanced and developing countries could reasonably be attributed to 
differences in capital-labor ratios, assume that production is governed by a Cobb-Douglas 
production function.  Then if the wage is equal to the marginal product of labor, the wage 
depends on the capital/labor ratio raised to a power that equals capital’s share of output. 
Capital labor ratios in the advanced world are roughly eight times those in developing 
                                                 
   
6 U.S. figures for Mexican-born with 5-8 years of schooling from the 2000 Census, Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Series, defined as annual wage and salary income divided by numbers of 
weeks worked and usual hours worked.  Mexican figures from Hanson (2005), table 7, for men 
30-59 with 6-8 years of schooling.  The $1.82 is an unweighted average for three age groups. 
Adjusted for purchasing power parity exchange rates, this is a differential of four times. 





countries. Assuming that capital’s share of output is 0.30, wages in high-income countries will 
be 87 percent higher than low-income countries.7  However, as Table 2 demonstrated, 
advanced country wages typically exceed those of developing countries by four to twelve 
times.  This calculation is supported by other findings. Hendricks (2002) approximates 
earnings of workers by real GDP per capita and estimates that, after taking account of 
differences in years of schooling and physical capital, there remain differences in earnings 
between immigrants in the US and persons in the low wage countries from which they came 
of a multiple of five to eight.  Oostendorp and I (2001, 2003) use the Occupational Wages 
Around the World data file, which contains estimates of wage rates in 161 detailed 
occupations in over 150 countries, to estimate the relation between capital-output ratios, 
average years of schooling, and indicators of the efficacy of competitive markets (from the 
Fraser Institute Economic Freedom data file) and earnings in the same detailed occupations 
                                                 
7  Let the production function be: Y= K
￿ L
1-￿, where output is Y, capital is K, labor is L, and 
where capital’s share of output is ￿, and labor’s share of output is 1- ￿, Differentiate with 
respect to labor to get the marginal product of labor, dy/dL = (K/L)
￿, and assume that the wage 
equals the marginal product  Then if K/L is 8 times larger in high-income countries, the wage 
will be 8





across countries.  These factors explain part of the cross country variation of earnings, but the 
huge initial variation in earnings among countries almost guarantees a substantial country 
wage gap, which may reflect the differences in underlying technologies of production. 
                                                                                                                                                         
low-income countries. 
As a result of the huge rise in productivity and earnings that an immigrant gains from 
working in an advanced country, the earnings of small numbers of immigrants in an advanced 
country can be large relative to the national incomes of their home countries. The 0.1 percent 
of India' s population living in the United States earn roughly the equivalent of 10 percent of 
India' s national income (Desai et al., 2001). 
 
How Do Immigrants Affect Their Countries of Arrival? 
Because immigrants are largely young working age persons, immigration reduces the 
average age of the population in immigrant-receiving countries. Even so, immigration does 
not provide a ready solution to the problems of retirement and pensions that face many 
developed economies. Younger immigrants eventually become elderly, and many have 
children who require social spending like education. Rates of immigration far above existing 
rates for immigration would be necessary to make a major contribution to resolving problems 
of aging populations. For example, the United Nations estimates that for immigration to 
stabilize the ratio of the number of retired persons divided by the number of workers, from 





to an actual total of 140,000 immigrants in 2001. Stabilizing the old-age dependency ratio in 
the United States over the same period would require that 10.8 million persons immigrated 
annually (UN, Replacement Migration, 2000, table IV.4, table IV.7), which compares to 1.1 
million immigrants in 2001.  For immigration to stabilize the dependency ratio by 2050, 32 
percent of the French population and 27 percent of the U.S. population at that time would be 
post-1995 immigrants. 
 In the basic model of immigration, immigrants reduce earnings of substitute factors 
and raise the earnings of complementary factors, where complements might include capital 
and some types of native-born labor.  Figure 1 uses the marginal product of labor schedule to 
examine how an increase in the supply of labor due to immigration affects the earnings of 
workers for whom the immigrants are assumed substitute.  The line S is the initial supply of 
labor.  Immigration of I persons increases the supply to S’.  This reduces the wage from Wo to 
Wo’.  Total output increases by the trapezoid DEGH, but much of this gain accrues to the 
immigrants.  The gain to residents is the welfare triangle DKE, which consists of the loss in 
incomes to factors that substitute for immigrants of BADK and a gain to factors 
complementary to immigrants.  Using variants of this model, most empirical analyses of the 
effect of immigration on receiving country economies seek to estimate the adverse effect of 
immigrant supply shocks on the earnings of native substitutes.  This approach does not mean 
that economists are excessively focused on the costs of immigration.  With constant returns to 





complements and the size of the welfare triangle.
8 If immigration had no adverse effects on 
native substitutes in this model, immigration would also have no beneficial effects on other 
factor earnings.  
                                                 
  
8 Let W = wage, S = supply of factors for whom immigrants are substitutes, ￿ be the change 
operator and I be the increase in supply from immigration. Then with constant returns to scale, 
the welfare gain is (½) I ￿W,where ￿W is the reduction in the pay of substitute factors due to 
immigration.  If ￿ is the elasticity of demand for substitutes, then ￿W/W = -1/￿ I/S and the 
welfare gain will be 1/2￿ (I)
2 (W/S).  Increasing or decreasing returns to scale would alter the 
benefits or costs of immigration on natives. 
Because immigrants concentrate in particular gateway cities or areas, a natural way to 
examine how immigration affects natives is to compare native earnings and employment 
between high- and low-immigrant areas.  Since studies of the minimum wage generally yield 
low estimated elasticities of demand for less-skilled workers (Brown, 1988; Card and Krueger, 
1997), we might expect area studies to find that immigration has huge wage effects in local 
markets.  After all, when demand is inelastic to wages, wages must change substantially to 
accommodate changes in supply.  In fact, studies find the opposite. For the United States, 
Freidberg and Hunt (1995) report that a 10 percent increase in the fraction of immigrants in 





labor market effect of the 1980 Mariel boatlift of low-skill immigrant Cubans into the Miami 
area; Hunt (1992) found only slight effects from the return of the pied noir from Algeria to 
France in 1962; Carrington and deLima (1996) found no effect of the return of Portuguese 
colonists from Africa to Portugal.   
What explains the modest or negligible relation between immigration and native wages 
or employment in local labor markets?  One possible explanation is that immigration induces 
offsetting internal migration of the native-born population.  This hypothesis has some 
plausibility. For example, low-skilled workers from the Midwest migrated to California in the 
1980s-1990s at lower rates than they had before the large flow of Mexicans to California. 
However, the fact that differences in earnings across local labor areas within a country persist 
over decades makes it implausible that internal migration could entirely offset the effects of a 
huge immigrant flow in a decade.  Analysts have reached no consensus about the extent to 
which internal migration explains the absence of any relation between immigration and wages 
among local labor markets (see the conflicting views in Borjas, Freeman, Katz, 1997; Filer, 
1992, Card, 2001).   
Another possibility is that the immigrant flows induce capital flows to an immigrant-
receiving area.  If this investment leads to the growth of immigrant-employing industries that 
sell output at fixed world prices, then wages would not respond to changes in labor supply 
(Leamer and Levinsohn, 1995).  This explanation also has some prima facie plausibility: for 
example, in New York and Los Angeles apparel industry “sweatshops” have grown that use 





industry mix in immigrant-intensive areas explains the modest impact of immigration on the 
wages of native workers in those areas.  
 Finally, many immigrants may have sufficiently different human capital from natives 
that they are complements for nominally similar native-born workers.  Mexican immigrants 
with less than high school education have an average of three years less schooling than 
Americans with less than high school education – although in studies of the U.S. labor market 
they are both counted as low-skilled.  And less educated Mexicans work in a different set of 
occupations and industries than most less educated Americans: for example, 6.5 percent of 
Mexican immigrants work in farming, compared to 0.5 percent of the U.S. native work force. 
Also, low educated Mexicans are disproportionately represented in low skill construction jobs, 
and in hotel and food services in particular regions where immigrant shares are high (Grieco 
and Ray, 2004). Immigrants make up 45 percent of tailors, 40 percent of farm workers, 38 
percent of taxi and limo drivers, 34 percent of private household workers, 31 percent of 
laundry and dry cleaning operatives.  In sports, immigrants make up 27 percent of major 
league baseball players and 47 percent of minor league baseball players (tabulated from 
Ruggles et al., 2004). But no study has estimated the impact of differences in skill mix or 
occupational composition as a way to explain the modest effect of immigrant flows on native 
labor. 
Perhaps the most prominent evidence that immigrant flows affect native wages is from 
Borjas (2003), who analyzes how time series variation in immigrant flows by education and 





for assessing the effect of highly skilled immigration on native substitutes since the markets 
for university graduates is national in scope, with high mobility across areas.  Indeed, looking 
at the labor market for Ph.D.s, Borjas (2005) finds that an immigration-induced increase in the 
supply of doctorates in a particular field depresses native earnings in that field with an 
elasticity of about 0.30. But the same story does not seem to apply to the country with the 
greatest immigration of highly educated persons, Israel, where the huge flow from the former 
Soviet Union had no discernible impacts on native outcomes (Friedberg, 2001, Weiss, 2000). 
 
How Does Emigration Affect Source Countries? 
    In principle, the impact of emigration on source countries can be illustrated by 
reversing the direction of the changes in Figure 1. A fall in supply of labor from S + I to S 
raises the wages of substitutes for immigrants and reduces the income of complementary 
factors, so that income in the source country falls.
9  However, this analysis ignores remittances 
from emigrants.  The IMF estimates that in 2003, immigrants remitted approximately $131 
billion worldwide, $79 billion of which went to developing economies (United Nations, 2004, 
Table IV.3, p. 107).  If, as some believe, unrecorded remittances are twice recorded 
remittances, developing country immigrants may have sent back to their home country about 
$160 billion.  In small countries, remittances can account for a large share of GDP and foreign 
exchange.  Even in a large country, remittances can greatly boost an economy.  In the 
                                                 
 
9 Berry and Soligo (1969) analyze how the emigrant’s effect on the home country depends on 
whether he or she owns capital, whether he or she takes that capital to the new country or leaves 






Philippines, remittances were 10.2 percent of GDP in 2003, up from 2.7 percent in 1990 
(International Organization for Migration, 2005a, p. 240).   
Looking at the effects on immigrant-sending communities, Unger (2005) reports that 
income grew more rapidly in Mexican municipalities that had high emigration than in those 
with low emigration and that per capita income growth was associated with the percentage of 
households that receive remittances across communities. Hanson (2005) found that areas in 
Mexico which have significant migration of less skilled workers to the United States had 
sizeable wage increases.  This finding is consistent with O’Rourke and Williamson’s (1999) 
analysis that earlier immigration from Ireland and Sweden raised wages in those countries in 
the 1800s and early 1900s.  Still, taking both the loss of emigrant labor and the effects of 
immigration on remittances, trade and capital flows, empirical analysis does not reach any 
firm conclusion about whether emigration hurts or helps source economies. 
Debate over the effects of emigration on home countries has focused on the emigration 
of highly skilled workers – “brain drain” – whose loss might be particularly harmful to the 
source country. Lowell, Findlay and Stewart (2004) estimate that in 2001 nearly one in ten 
tertiary-educated adults in the developing world resided in North America, Australia or 
western Europe.  The magnitude of this flow varies among countries.  Some 40 percent of 
university-educated adults from Turkey and Morocco reside in OECD countries. Over half of 
university-educated adults from the Caribbean live in the United States.  In some African 
countries, more than 35 percent of citizens with college education reside abroad (Desai, Kapur 





the tertiary-educated population emigrated (Carrington and Detragiache, 1998; Adams, 2003).  
The traditional view of brain drain was that it is particularly harmful to developing 
countries, which invested in the schooling of the emigré but do not gain the social returns on 
that investment.  To recompense the source country, Bhagwati (1976) proposed a tax on such 
immigrants.  China has required prospective emigrants to pay a fee dependent on their 
education and years of work in China.  If they have worked for sufficient years in China, there 
is no fee.  But most countries do not exercise control over potential emigrants.  And China 
along with other developing countries has not tried to reduce the flow of international students 
from their country, even though about 90 percent of Chinese Ph.D. graduates from U.S. 
universities choose to remain and work overseas for many years (Finn, 2003). 
Emigration of doctors, nurses, and other highly educated medical and health specialists 
from developing countries raises especially great concerns.  In some countries, a large 
proportion of health professionals are foreign-born, mostly from developing countries.  In 
2000, 23 percent of health professionals in the United Kingdom were born outside western 
Europe, making this the occupation with the highest percentage foreign-born in the country 
(Dobson et al., 2001, Table 13.12)  
But even in this case, source countries have not tried to restrict the freedom of 
residents to migrate.  The Philippines has adopted the opposite strategy: developing nursing 
schools that train their students for working in the U.S. medical system, so that they can more 
readily emigrate.   





workers should reduce national income for those remaining at home, particularly of the less 
educated. But the brain drain could benefit the source country in ways beyond remittances. 
The potential to migrate can raise the expected return to schooling and induce more persons to 
invest in skills (Beine et al., 2003), although this outcome would require that many who invest 
with the intention of going overseas do not in fact do so, and that there is a high  social return 
to higher education in the home country.  Emigrant scientists, engineers, or entrepreneurs 
working in an advanced country could create innovations that improve productivity in that 
country and thus lower the prices of the goods sold to their home country.  Emigrant social 
networks could foster trade and capital flows between the home country and the receiving 
country; for example, Rauch and Trinidade (2002) find that immigrants to Canada increase 
imports from their home country by 3 percent and exports by 1 percent. A sizeable immigrant 
population in advanced countries may also affect the foreign policy of advanced countries 
toward the developing country. Increased immigrant Moslem populations in Europe have 
influenced European views of Israeli-Arab disputes. 
Comparisons of the growth of countries with differing levels of emigration (Beine et 
al., 2003) support the view that some level of emigration can benefit the home country, but the 
evidence is limited (Commander, Kangasniemi and Winters, 2004).  The economic effects of 
the brain drain and other people flows need to be analyzed as part of the broader pattern of the 
globalization of economic activity rather than as stand-alone phenomena.  
 






 In models of international trade based on differing factor endowments across 
countries, either trade of final goods and services or movements of factors of production can 
serve to equalize prices and earnings (Mundell, 1957).  If country A has more labor relative to 
capital than country B, it can send labor to country B directly through immigration or 
indirectly through the export of labor-intensive goods.  Restrict immigration, and trade should 
increase.  Restrict trade, and immigration should increase.  In the debate in the early 1990s 
over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), treaty proponents argued that by 
creating more jobs and higher wages in Mexico, the treaty would reduce migration to the 
United States (International Organization for Migration, 2005a, pp. 194-5). If immigration and 
trade are limited, capital flows will substitute for them and create pressures toward equalizing 
marginal productivity around the world. 
But trade, people flows, and capital flows were not substitutes in the U.S. economy 
during the 1980s-2000s, when imports of goods and services, and financial capital, and skilled 
and unskilled immigrants increased.  In the 1870-1940 earlier period of mass immigration, 
trade and immigration do not appear to be substitutes, either (Collins, O’Rourke and 
Williamson, 1997). 
 
Technology and Complementarities    
So why might people flows be complements rather than substitutes for trade and 





1983; Markusen and Svennson, 1985).  If an advanced economy uses more productive 
technology than a developing country, then returns to both labor and capital will be higher in 
the advanced economy and both factors will migrate there (Gierking and Mutti, 1983).  Davis 
and Weinstein (2002) present a model in which this outcome harms U.S. well-being, because 
with more workers and capital, the U.S. economy expands production of the high tech goods 
in which it has comparative advantage, driving down the price of those goods and thus the 
earnings of native workers and capital.  At the same time, the flow of workers and capital 
reduces the production of the goods the U.S. imports from overseas, driving up the prices of 
imports.  In one sense, the U.S. technological edge gives it a “monopoly rent” that gets spread 
over immigrant labor and capital in the United States and that falls as increased production 
lowers the terms of trade.  On the other side, advocates for the immigration of skilled 
immigrants argue that they help produce a technological edge for the county, which benefits 
all U.S. citizens. 
People flows might complement trade flows in other ways, too. Investing overseas 
often requires knowledge and monitoring of local conditions, ranging from local management 
or corporate insiders to regulatory and other decision-making bodies (Stultz, 2005).  Large 
flows of foreign direct investment are thus accompanied by business trips and temporary 
assignments of executives to countries.  Trade requires knowledge of suppliers, as well.   
Off-shoring of work, in which a firm sends work overseas rather than recruiting the 
qualified worker to come to the advanced economy, fits the trade-immigration substitution 





of substitute native workers, but the effects are complex. Some work cannot be sent offshore, 
because it requires capital and other complementary resources that are exclusive to the 
advanced country. Thus, immigrants might put greater pressure on native workers, since they 
could substitute for natives in all activities, whereas offshore employees would be limited in 
their activities. In this sense, substitute native workers might prefer off-shoring to 
immigration.  On the other, immigrants are likely to be paid more in the destination country 
than workers doing off shored work in a source country, which creates less competitive 
pressure on native wages. 
 
   Immigration and Comparative Advantage 
 
Analyses of trade among advanced economies, which have similar costs of labor and 
factor endowments, posit that trade occurs because countries gain comparative advantage from 
being the first-mover on new technologies and/or from increasing returns -- say through 
learning as output increases or through positive spillovers from one firm to another or from 
sector to sector.  Comparative advantage in turn induces factor mobility, which can alter factor 
endowments.   The United States is a prime example of a country where immigration has 
responded to the country’s technological edge and added to its comparative advantage.  The 
United States has a comparative advantage in exporting relatively high technology products. It 
imports science and engineering specialists, who help the country maintain its position at the 
technological frontier.  During the 1990s, the United States greatly increased the proportion of 
foreign-born workers among scientists and engineers, as shown in Table 3.  Nearly 60 percent 
of the growth in the number of U.S.-based Ph.D. scientists and engineers over this decade 





Could the U.S. economy maintain its comparative advantage in high-tech sectors 
absent the huge immigrant flow?  This issue is critical in national science policy (Freeman, 
2005).  Presumably the country could expand support for research and development activity 
and for technology education in a way that could attract more citizens to these fields. But it 
would take some time for domestic supplies to replace immigrant supplies.  In the interim, 
many multinationals might accelerate the on-going shift in research and development activities 
overseas, reducing the U.S. comparative advantage in high tech.  At the same time, the greater 
the flow of immigrant scientists and engineers, the smaller will be the incentive for the native-
born to choose these careers. 
Many other advanced countries also seek highly educated immigrants.  While the 
English-speaking countries have been leaders in seeking to attract educated immigrants, the 
major European countries have stepped up their efforts to attract top talent from developing 
countries and to retain their own scientists and engineers.  Even Japan, which has traditionally 
shunned immigrants, has come to recognize the potential value of these particular immigrants. 
 The response of the U.S. academic community to the more stringent visa policies for students 
post-9/11 and the ensuing response of the U.S. State Department to ease restrictions shows the 
extent to which countries compete in the global market for highly talented students (National 
Academy of Science, 2005). 
  
 
More People Flows? 
 
 
Governments of receiving countries have hardened their stances against less-skilled 





immigrant flows.  In 1976 the United Nations surveyed national governments about their 
views toward immigration: 11 of 150 governments wanted more immigrants; 10 wanted fewer 
immigrants; while the rest of the countries were satisfied with their level of immigration.  In 
2003, the United Nations conducted a similar survey that covered 194 countries: 10 wanted to 
increase the number of immigrants, while 65 wanted to lower the rate of immigration (United 
Nations, 2004, Table III.2). Surveys show that the majority of citizens in most countries 
believe that their country should restrict immigration more than it does (ISSP, 1995; PEW 
Global Attitudes, 2003).  In European Union countries with large welfare states, the major 
stated economic factor underlying opposition is the fear that immigrants will burden the 
welfare state (Dustmann and Preston, 2004).  Persons who might be adversely affected by 
immigrants in the labor market show modestly more negative attitudes toward immigration 
than others (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001, for the United States; Dustmann and Preston, 2004, 
for the European Union).   
However, public opinion and national policies toward immigration seems to rest on 
issues well beyond gains and losses in the labor market. Some natives worry that immigrants 
will present a cultural threat to their way of life and reduce social cohesion.  This view is 
reflected in the attitudes of some Europeans toward immigrants from developing countries, 
particularly those from Moslem countries.  Another factor that determines attitudes toward 
immigration is that immigrants eventually become citizens and affect politics.  In the United 
States, both political parties seek support from the growing Hispanic community and tailor 
their policies on immigration to appeal to that community.  In 2000 the AFL-CIO reversed its 





undocumented immigrant workers and endorsed amnesty for millions of undocumented 
workers and repeal of the employer sanctions law.  The underlying rationale was that the 
growing immigrant community would provide good recruits and political allies for unions, and 
that legalizing the workers would reduce the impact of such immigrants in reducing wages and 
opportunities for other workers.   
 
Easing Immigration Restrictions  
The critical barrier to immigration is the restrictive policies of destination countries 
like the United States, Canada, Australia, the European Union, and Japan. If more persons 
immigrated to these countries, world GDP would rise and the inequality of wages among 
countries would presumably decline. As Dani Rodrik (2001) said: “If international policy 
makers were really interested in maximizing worldwide efficiency, … they would all be busy 
at work liberalizing immigration restrictions.” How might the world increase immigration? 
The most widely discussed policy reform is to increase temporary migration.  Mode 4 
of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is designed to enhance the temporary 
movement of service workers. The 2005 World Migration Report suggested that the 
international community develop a Temporary Foreign Workers Programme to stimulate and 
protect temporary migration (International Organization for Migration, 2005a, chapter 10; see 
also Brucker et al., 2002; Rodrik, 2001). Other proposals that could increase the number of 
immigrants and their contribution to economic well-being include providing greater protection 
to migrants through international law and developing better financial infrastructure for 





immigrants under greater legal protection could produce economic gains for receiving 
countries without risking some of the social costs, but in the past temporary immigration has 
often led to permanent immigration.
   While these temporary migration policies could increase the number of immigrants 
somewhat, it would take “radically economic” policies to have a major impact on immigrant 
flows and to move world output toward the levels that an unfettered movement of labor would 
produce.  
 
Radically Economic Policies 
The most radically economic policy would be to remove the bulk of restrictions on 
international migration, placing immigration on a par with free trade and with the now largely 
free flow of capital. The idea of being able to move to a different country to work freely seems 
radical in this era of substantial immigration controls, but it was common in earlier periods.  
Many immigrants came freely to the New World in the days of colonization (the exception 
being slaves and transported convicts). Although the United States restricted immigration of 
some groups from the nineteenth century on, not until 1921 did the country seek to limit 
numerically the numbers who came.  The United Kingdom did not regulate entry of foreigners 
who came to work until World War I; and introduced restrictions on immigration from the 
Empire and Commonwealth only with the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962.  The 
United Kingdom and Ireland continue to have free immigration between them, and the 
European Union has an increasingly open labor market across member states. One 





does effectively have open immigration, at least for persons crossing the Mexican border. 
However, because most of the gains from immigration accrue to the immigrants rather 
than to the residents of destination countries (as stressed earlier), there is little incentive for 
destination countries to ease immigration restrictions.  The only way I can think of to increase 
the receptivity of destination countries to accept more immigrants would be redistribute the 
benefits of immigration so that a greater share of the benefits flow to natives and a lower share 
of the benefits to immigrants.  The “radically economic” policy here would be to use the price 
system to equilibrate the market for immigrants rather than to ration entry.  An immigrant 
receiving country could charge admission fees or auction immigration visas or place special 
taxes on immigrants, and use those funds to redistribute the gains from immigration to 
existing citizens.  
Pricing entry into a country would simultaneously reduce the number of immigrants 
who want to come (many of who also cannot come under the rationing policies that receiving 
countries use) and would increase the number that receiving countries would admit.  
Auctioning immigrant visas would assure that those who expect to gain the most from 
immigration and would be willing to pay the highest amount would be admitted. Natives who 
wanted to bring relatives in the United States or firms who wanted to bring particular workers 
to the country could sponsor immigrants.  On the other hand, since young persons with limited 
capital who could gain greatly from immigration might be unable to fund themselves, they 
would be better served by paying an extra amount from future income taxes, in the same 
manner that Australia allows young persons to borrow for higher education and then repay 





 Charging admission may strike some readers as crass and offensive, inconsistent with 
Emma Lazarus’s poem on the Statue of Liberty, but the proposal is not as radical as it might 
first seem.
10  American firms that use H-1B visas to bring skilled workers already pay the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service $610, $500 of which goes to a special fund for 
training U.S. citizens.  An auction of the H-1Bs would almost certainly raise more revenue 
and redistribute more of the gains from this form of immigration from the companies or visa 
entrants to the country as whole. Canada has a successful special immigration track for 
Investor Immigrants, which is limited to persons with business experience and a net worth of 
at least $800,000 (Canadian) who invest $400,000 for five years in Canada.  Insisting that the 
wealthy businessperson invest in the country is an indirect way of charging entry. The United 
States makes it easier for non-citizens who enlist in the military to gain citizenship.  In the 
early part of the twentieth century, the United States had a head tax on immigrants. 
How much might immigrants be willing to pay for citizenship in an advanced country? 
 Since increases in income from immigrating from a low-income country to a high-income 
country can be quite large, the amount of money that could be raised by putting a price  
immigration could be substantial, at the minimum on the order of the magnitude of the 
remittances that immigrants send home.  For a worker who comes to the US from a low 
income country, where wages may be 20 percent of U.S. wages in purchasing power parity 
terms, the gains would conservatively be on the order of $5,000 to $10,000 per year for 
workers who earned around the U.S. median income. This annual difference would cumulate 
over a working lifetime to $100,000, depending on the discount rate for future income.  A 
fifty-fifty division of this gain would be substantial – if immigrants were charged $50,000 
apiece, one million additional immigrants would produce $50 billion dollars in tax receipts.  
                                                 
10  This fits with the Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1983) analysis of the optimal policy for the United 
States to adopt with respect to immigration from Mexico and with Wong’s (1983) analysis of the 






This type of scheme does have potential deleterious non-pecuniary effects.  Perhaps 
selling or auctioning immigrant visas would reduce the loyalty that new citizens feel to a 
country, or lead to greater illegal immigration, or antagonize groups in the country or outside 
in ways that would be harmful.  Taxing immigrant A at higher rates than native B may strike 
many as unfair, particularly for immigrants in the lower parts of the income distribution.  In 
addition, shifting some of the gains to immigrants to the natives of wealthy recipient countries 
could reduce the flow of remittances to the poor sending countries, which would lower well-
being in those countries.  Wealthier persons are likely to be complements to low-skilled 
immigrants and would thus benefit doubly from the immigration.  But for countries with 
extensive welfare states, where natives may pay high taxes for systems in which low paid 
immigrants gain, some form of redistribution of the benefits of immigration may be necessary 




People flows are large and growing but remain smaller than trade and capital flows, and thus 
represent a promising way to attain global economic benefits. Greater mobility of labor across 
borders could raise the output and economic well-being of workers in developing countries more 
than many other policies associated with globalization.  Recipient countries would experience 
modest gains as well, but because immigration can be economically and culturally disruptive, 
countries are unlikely to favor free immigration even to the moderate extent that they favor free 





the key issue in getting citizens of advanced countries to look more favorably on immigration is 
to design policies that give a larger share of the benefits to receiving countries.  Even with 
current immigration policies, aging populations and low birth rates in advanced countries 
coupled with huge disparities in pay around the world and increased education in developing 
countries are likely to lead to increased immigration in the decades ahead. People flows will 
become more important in globalization and should help reduce global inequality among workers 
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Source: United Nations (2002, Figure 1) for immigration. International Organization of 
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Source: Freeman and Oostendorp, Occupational Wages Around the World Data File, 2003 
data, <http://www.nber.org/oww/>. To obtain the quintile earnings, I identified the appropriate 
country and gave the earnings of that country – that is, for clicker cutter, I give the earnings of 
the 6
th highest country and 6






























































Source: 1990 and 2000 bachelor’s, masters, Ph.D. and Ph.D.s less than 45 years of age, 
tabulated from Census of Population, IPUMS data; <http://www.ipums.umn.edu>. 2004 
figures tabulated from NBER merged outgoing rotation files at 
http://www.nber.org/data/morg.html,  Post-Doc, NSF, Science and Engineering Indicators, 








Note: The effects of immigration on natives in the receiving country are shown by the increase 
in supply from S to S+I. The effects of emigration on natives in the sending country are shown 
by the decrease in supply from S+I to S.  
   
Figure 1: Gains & Losses from 
Immigration and Emigration
 